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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRISONERS' RIGHTS-PRISON REGULA-
TION DENYING INMATE THE RIGHT TO ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATE WIFE
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir.
1990).
Steven Goodwin currently is serving a fourteen-year prison sen-
tence for drug offenses' at the United States Medical Center for Fed-
eral Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.2 He will be eligible for parole in
late 1991, and will be released no later than February 26, 1995.1 Good-
win and his wife, who is not incarcerated, wish to have children.' Good-
win is concerned that his wife's age at the time of his scheduled release
date will increase her chances of bearing a child with birth defects.'
Therefore, he sought permission to artificially inseminate his wife.'
When Goodwin initially sought' authorization and assistance from
prison officials, the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) refused to grant his
request.7 The Bureau denied the request because it had no program or
policy which would govern such a procedure.8 Goodwin appealed the
Bureau's decision, but his subsequent requests were also denied.9
Therefore, in August 1987 Goodwin filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus'0 seeking a court order to compel prison authorities to
allow him to artificially inseminate his wife and to provide certain nec-
essary assistance in conjunction with the procedure." Goodwin in-
I. Note, Marriage, Procreation and the Prisoner: Should Reproductive Alternatives Sur-
vive During Incarceration?, 5 ToURo L. REV. 189, 190 (1988).
2. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1396 (8th Cir. 1990). Goodwin is assigned to the
Medical Center because of its proximity to his family and not for medical reasons. Id. at 1396 n.2.
3. 908 F.2d at 1396. Goodwin will be eligible for parole on September 2, 1991. Id. Prison
officials noted there was "good reason to believe" that he would be granted parole during the early
stages of his eligibility period. Id. at 1396-97.
4. Id. at 1396.
5. Id. at 1397. For example, based on his wife's age at the time of his latest possible
release date, "[hier risk of having a child born with Down's syndrome or a chromosomal abnor-
mality will be I in 450 and I in 225, respectively." Id.
6. Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aftd, 908 F.2d 1395
(8th Cir. 1990).
7. 908 F.2d at 1397.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The writ was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2241 (1988), governing the court's power
to grant such writs.
II. 908 F.2d at 1397. Goodwin sought a court order that would force prison officials:
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formed officials that he and his wife would bear the costs of the
procedure."
The magistrate granted Goodwin partial relief1 s and recommended
that prison officials also grant his request."' The magistrate found that
a prisoner's right to procreate survives incarceration."8 Also, the magis-
trate noted that the prison's "blanket denial" of Goodwin's request,
based on the absence of an applicable policy governing such a proposal,
violated the minimum requisites of due process.1 6 Thus, the magistrate
recommended that Goodwin be allowed to "resubmit his request in de-
tailed fashion" so that prison officials could specifically address his pro-
posals.1 7 Prior to Goodwin's filing a revised request, however, the Bu-
reau adopted a policy outlining the rationale for its opposition to
artificial insemination. 8 In this statement, the Bureau expressed its
concern about the possible ramifications of allowing artificial insemina-
tion while imprisoned, particularly if such program would have to be
made available to female prisoners who might bear children while in-
(1) to grant him permission "to produce acceptable semen for impregnation of his
wife"; (2) to allow several doctors ... and at most, one medical assistant to enter the
institution "for the purpose of properly collecting semen under safe and sanitary proce-
dures and for freezing said semen in the proper manner"; (3) to give him tests to ensure
he was free of sexually transmitted diseases...; and (4) to refrain from transferring
him to any other institution until the dispute was fully resolved.
Id.
12. Id.
13. 702 F. Supp. at 1452.
14. 908 F.2d at 1397. "[T]he magistrate recommended that Goodwin submit his request in
a clear and detailed fashion so that prison officials could either accommodate his request or make
specific objections thereto." Id.
15. Id.
16. 702 F. Supp. at 1452.
17. Id.
18. 908 F.2d at 1397. The policy statement issued by the Bureau provides:
[S]ound correctional policy dictates against allowing inmates to artificially inseminate
another person. . . .[l]f [artificial insemination were] allowed in one case, all of [the
Bureau's] institutions would either have to develop collection, handling, and storage
procedures for semen or be opened up to private medical or technical persons to come
in to collect the semen. This situation would either require a significant drain on re-
sources or create significant security risks, especially in connection with inmates with a
high security classification. . . .The Bureau strives, to the extent possible, to treat all
inmates equally. Therefore, in connection with indigent inmates, the Executive Staff
felt that the Bureau would be in the position of having to either provide or pay for these
services for these inmates and, with respect to female inmates, to significantly expand
the medical services available.
Id. at 1397-98.
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carcerated.1 9 Furthermore, the Bureau addressed the costs of such a
program as well as the various security problems which would arise.20
Because of the Bureau's announcement, Goodwin amended his pe-
tition before his case was reviewed by the district court. 1 He requested
the Bureau's "assistance in providing him with a clean container in
which to deposit his semen, and a means to swiftly transport the
container outside the prison" for delivery to his wife.22 Goodwin contin-
ued to maintain that he would bear the costs of the procedure.23 The
district court reviewed the record from the magistrate's ruling with
"utmost scrutiny" and held that Goodwin did not have a fundamental
right of procreation. 24 Specifically, the court held: "[Riegardless of the
right petitioner has asserted, whether a right to privacy, a right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment, or a due process right, he does
not have a fundamental constitutional right to father a child through
artificial insemination that survives incarceration. 25
Goodwin appealed the decision.2" Although the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to decide whether prisoners have a funda-
mental right of procreation, it applied a test of lesser scrutiny and up-
held the denial of Goodwin's request.2 7 Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d
1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
The right of procreation is one based on the right to privacy. 28 The
right to privacy is among several fundamental constitutional rights not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.29 It has been recognized as
19. Id. at 1398.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1398. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
reviewed Goodwin's petition in 1988. 702 F. Supp. at 1452.




26. 908 F.2d at 1398.
27. Id. The court determined, "[Tihe restriction imposed by the Bureau is reasonably re-
lated to achieving its legitimate penological interest." Id.
28. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972). For a good overview of the right of privacy, see Rubenfeld, The Right of Pri-
vacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989).
29. Certain "individaul rights which do not have a specific textual basis in the Constitution
or its amendments [have been] deemed . . . to be 'fundamental'." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 at 369 (3d ed. 1988). These have been placed into six
categories: (1) freedom of association; (2) the right of suffrage and of participation in the electoral
process; (3) the "right of personal mobility"; (4) the "right to fairness in the criminal process";
(5) the right of procedural due process; and (6) the right to privacy. Id. at 370-71.
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"4one aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment."3 0 The privacy doctrine is only about twenty
years old" and embodies a concept that certain personal decisions are
private and should be free from governmental interference. 3 It has
been extended to include private matters deemed "intimate or per-
sonal." ' a Procreation is a personal decision covered by the right to
privacy. 4
Ironically, one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions recognizing
the importance of an individaul's right to procreate was a case involv-
ing a prison inmate. In Skinner v. Oklahoma 5 the United States Su-
preme Court struck down a statute enabling the state to initiate pro-
ceedings to seek sterilization of certain habitual offenders.36 The
petitioner in the case had been convicted twice for armed robbery.
3 7
After his second conviction, the Oklahoma Attorney General instituted
proceedings to have him sterilized.38 Despite legal challenges to the
statute at the state level, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the
judgment directing that the petitioner be given a vasectomy. 39
The United States Supreme Court held the statute unconstitu-
tional on equal protection grounds and reversed the state court's deci-
sion."0 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, explained that mar-
riage and procreation are "basic civil rights of man" and "are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."'" Further-
more, since the liberty interests at stake are so vital, any government
infringement thereon must be reviewed with strict scrutiny.'
2
A more recent Supreme Court case acknowledging the right of
30. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
31. Rubenfeld, supra note 28, at 740. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the
Court announced: "[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion." Id. at 483.
32. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 461, 465-66 (1987).
33. Id. at 466.
34. Nowak, supra note 29, at 371. "[T]his right to privacy has been held to include rights
to freedom of choice in marital decisions, child bearing, and child rearing." Id.
35. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Although the case was not decided under the privacy rubric, it
nonetheless laid the foundation for the recognition of procreative rights.
36. Id. at 536-38.
37. Id. at 537.
38. Id.
39. 189 Okla. 235, 115 P.2d 123 (1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
40. 316 U.S. at 538-43.




procreation is Carey v. Population Services International.'s In Carey a
New York statute placing certain restrictions on the sale of contracep-
tives to minors was challenged." The Court determined that the statute
unconstitutionally violated the right of privacy under the due process
clause.4" The Court stated that "[t]he decision whether or not to bear
or beget a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices [included in the right of personal privacy]."
Since procreation is a fundamental right, any statute interfering
with it would ordinarily be held to a high level of scrutiny.'7 However,
prisoner status has evoked an analysis under a separate set of principles
evolving from a line of Supreme Court cases involving prisoners'
rights. 8
Several early views developed concerning the status of persons in-
carcerated and the legal rights they retained. The first view, which sur-
faced in some early decisions, reflected an attitude that prisoners were
slaves of the state and should be afforded no constitutional rights.' 9 A
second view emerged in Price v. Johnston50 when the Supreme Court
held that the rights of those imprisoned were necessarily curtailed be-
cause of the nature of confinement. The Court noted, "Lawful incarcer-
ation brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many priv-
ileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying
our penal system."' 51 A third and more expansive view was that a pris-
oner retained the same rights as an ordinary citizen except for those
rights, which by necessary implication, must be taken from him by the
law.52 The Supreme Court has held that some constitutional rights sur-
vive incarceration. 53 The modern view of the status of prisoners' rights
43. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
44. Id. at 681.
45. Id. at 685.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 685-86. See also Nowak, supra note 29, at 370-71.
48. See infra note 102-106 and accompanying text.
49. Note, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners' Rights: A "Turner" for the Worse?
Turner v. Safley, 33 VILL. L. REv. 393, 399 (1988). For an excellent discussion of these historical
views, see Cohen, The Law of Prisoners' Rights: An Overview, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 321 (1988).
50. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
51. Id. at 285.
52. Cohen, supra note 49, at 323 (citing Coffin v. Reichard, 148 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945)). Cohen explains that "there is a 'rights are preferred' position
inherent in this formulation." Id.
53. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prisoners have right of protection
against cruel and unusual purishment); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoners have
protections of the due process clause). See also Note, Prisoners' Fourth Amendment Right to
1991]
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:671
began to crystalize with a series of cases in the 1970s. The Supreme
Court also embarked on a struggle to establish the proper standard of
review for inmate claims of constitutional infringements.
One of the first of these cases was Procunier v. Martinez,4 in
which the Court appeared to bring an end to the federal courts' hands-
off approach of dealing with prisoners' rights cases.55 In Martinez in-
mates in the California Department of Corrections brought a class ac-
tion challenging various regulations providing for the censorship of in-
mate mail 6 and restrictions on attorney-client interviews.57 The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions"' and held the
challenged regulations unconstitutional. 9
Regarding prison authorities' practice of censoring prisoners' mail,
the Court's first task was to develop the proper standard for reviewing
such a claim. 0 Since the censorship of prisoners' correspondence also
impinged first amendment rights of nonprisoners, the Court reasoned
that the proper standard of review did not entail a determination of the
Privacy: Expanding a Constricted View. 22 Hous. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
[lI]t is fairly well accepted that prisoners retain fourteenth amendment due process pro-
tection, first amendment freedom of speech and religion, protection against racial dis-
crimination, and eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court has both stated and maintained that no "iron curtain" separates
prisons from the reach of the Constitution.
Id. at 1066.
54. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), overruled much of the
holding in Martinez. For a discussion of this, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
55. 416 U.S. at 404. The Court acknowledged that federal courts traditionally employed a
"broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration." Id. Recognizing the need for
deference to prison officials, the Court nonetheless explained that federal and state prison regula-
tions which 'offend[s] a fundamental constitutional guarantee" should necessarily be reviewed by
the courts. Id. at 405.
56. Id. at 399. Specifically, the censorship complaints arose from Director's Rule 1201
which provided: "Do not agitate, unduly complain, magnify grievances, or behave in any way
which might lead to violence." Id. at 399 n.2. The phrases "unduly complain" and "magnify
grievances" were applied to other rules regarding mail privileges. Id. Both incoming and outgoing
mail were screened by censors. Id. at 400.
57. Id. at 419. The administrative rule governing this practice provided: "Investigators for
an attorney-of-record will be confined to not more than two. Such investigators must be licensed
by the State or must be members of the State Bar. Designation must be made in writing by the
Attorney." Id. at 419. This policy involved a ban on the use of paralegals and law students from
conducting interviews with inmates. Id.
58. Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973). For subsequent history, see
supra note 54.
59. 416 U.S. at 422.
60. Id. at 406-07.
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legal status of prisoners.6 Consequently, the Court announced a two-
part test as the proper standard of review for prison mail censorship
regulations.6" Under the test, the regulation or practice had to promote
"an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
supression of expression." 63 Secondly, the proposed limitation could be
no greater than necessary to protect the particular interest involved. 64
Applying this test, the Court held the challenged regulation un-
constitutional.65 The Court explained that the Department of Correc-
tion's practice of censoring statements that "unduly complain" or
"magnify grievances" did not further any legitimate governmental in-
terest.66 Furthermore, in the event of a decision to censor particular
correspondence, the Court agreed with the lower court's requirement
that the affected inmate be accorded minimum procedural safe-
quards.67 The Court also affirmed the lower court's decision invalidat-
ing the regulation restricting prisoners' access to legal personnel.8 The
Court held the rule was "an unjustifiable restriction on the right of
access to the courts. 69
In the same year Martinez was decided, the Supreme Court
handed down another important prisoners' rights decision. In Pell v.
Procunier7 0 a group of inmates at the San Quentin State Penitentiary
7'
alleged that a California Department of Corrections regulation7" re-
stricting inmates' access to the press violated their first amendment
61. Id. at 407-09. Instead, the Court looked to decisions "dealing with the general problem
of incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance of legitimate gov-
ernmental activities." Id. at 409. One of the Court's examples of how the regulation infringed
upon the rights of nonprisoners is especially interesting: "The wife of a prison inmate who is not
permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her
interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to
him." Id. at 409.
62. Id. at 413.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 415.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 417-18. These involved the notification of a prisoner upon the censorship of a
letter written by or addressed to him and an opportunity for him to protest the decision. Id. at
418-19. Also; complaints were to be referred to a person other than the original prison official who
had censored the letter. Id.
68. Id. at 419.
69. Id.
70. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
71. Id. at 820 n.l.
72. Section 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual prohibited media
interviews with certain inmates. 417 U.S. at 819.
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right to free speech.7 The district court held the prohibition unconsti-
tutional and granted summary judgment in favor of the inmates .7
Upon reviewing the regulation's impact on the inmates' constitu-
tional rights, the Court held that a prisoner "retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a pris-
oner or with the legitimate penoligical objectives of the corrections sys-
tem."'75 Explaining that prisoners' first amendment rights must be ana-
lyzed in light of the policies and goals of the corrections system while
allowing deference to prison officials, the Court found that reasonable
alternatives existed whereby prisoners could have access to the outside
world.
71
The next important prisoners' rights case also involved a first
amendment challenge. In 1977 in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Union77 inmates brought suit to enjoin the North Carolina Department
of Corrections (NCDC) from frustrating their attempts to form and
operate a prisoners' union.78 Among other things, prison officials pre-
vented bulk mailings by the union.79 The inmates contended, and the
lower court found, that NCDC's efforts to prevent the formation of a
union violated the prisoners' first and fourteenth amendment rights of
free speech, association, and equal protection."
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist restated the Pell char-
73. Id. at 820. A group of journalists also alleged first amendment violations. The district
court rejected their constitutional claim and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the "First
Amendment [did] not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information
not available to the public generally." Id. at 833 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684
(1972)). Since the Court found that the regulation did not affect the journalists' constitutional
rights, it did not discuss what type of standard would have been appropriate for reviewing the
rights of nonprisoner litigants in such a case. Id. at 833-34. This distinguished the case from
Martinez where the Court reviewed the challenged regulation based on its incidental impact on
nonprisoners.
74. Id. at 821.
75. Id. at 822.
76. Id. at 824. The Court noted that the prisoners could be visited by family members,
friends, attorneys, and the clergy. Inmates could also have access to members of the press via
mail. Id. at 824-25.
77. 433 U.S. 119, 121 (1977).
78. Id. at 121.
79. Id. at 130 n.7.
80. Id. at 121. The basis for the prisoners' equal protection claim was tha*t the union had
been denied certain privileges (i.e., the ability to hold meetings and to mail leaflets) that had been
extended to other groups within the prison (i.e., Alcoholics Anonymous). Id. at 124. This argu-
ment failed chiefly because the Court determined that prisons were not public forums. Therefore,
prison officials needed only to show "a rational basis for their distinctions between organizational
groups." Id. at 134.
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acterization of prisoners' first amendment rights. 81 Justice Rehnquist
then emphasized the policy reasons for affording deference to prison
officials' "expert judgment" in matters of prison administration." The
Court explained that lower courts should defer to the judgment of
prison officials unless there is substantial evidence that the prison offi-
cials' response to particular prison needs has been exaggerated.
83
In Jones the majority determined that the NCDC's restrictions
were reasonable and "consistent with the inmates' status as prisoners
and with the legitimate operational considerations of the institution. 8"
Since the mail restriction involved only bulk mailing and the State had
not otherwise hampered the prisoners' ability to communicate griev-
ances, the Court stated that first amendment rights were "barely impli-
cated" by the prisoners' complaint.88 The prisoners' first amendment
associational rights also had to yield to the interests of prison secur-
ity.8 ' Thus, Jones made clear that if inmates cannot demonstrate the
unreasonableness of a challenged regulation, prison officials' burden in
justifying it will be slight.8
In 1979 the Court faced the issue of rights of pretrial detainees. In
Bell v. Wolfish 8 detainees89 brought suit challenging confinement con-
ditions and practices90 at a federal custodial facility.91 The Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision to enjoin a
variety of the challenged practices at the facility.92 The court of ap-
peals reasoned that since pretrial detainees had not been convicted of
81. Id. at 129.
82. Id. at 128 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). The Court noted,
"Becuase the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have ... recog-
nized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators." Id. at
126.
83. Id. at 128 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
84. Id. at 130.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 132.
87. Id. at 127-28.
88. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
89. The detainees were persons who were being held in custody for criminal charges prior to
trial. Id. at 523.
90. The "veritable potpourri of complaints" included "overcrowded conditions, undue length
of confinement, improper searches, inadequate recreational, educational and employment opportu-
nities, insufficient staff, and objectionable restrictions on the purchase and receipt of personal
items and books." Id. at 527.
91. Id. at 523. The respondents were being held at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in
New York City which was primarily designed to house pretrial detainees. Id.
92. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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any crime, they should retain the same rights as unincarcerated
individuals.93
The Supreme Court reached a different conclusion. Writing for
the majority once again, Justice Rehnquist addressed the detainees' ar-
gument that the presumption of innocence9 should protect them from
the complained of conditions at the facility.95 The Court determined
that although the presumption of innocence provided numerous protec-
tions for persons accused of crimes,96 it was not applicable to detainees'
rights regarding the conditions of their confinement. 7 Similarly, "the
detainee's desire to be free from discomfort" was not a fundamental
liberty interest.
9 8
Thus, the majority determined that the proper inquiry was
whether the challenged conditions constituted punishment.9 Emphasiz-
ing the policy of deferring to prison officials, the Court proceeded to
systematically address the specific complaints of the detainees.100 Since
the conditions did not constitute punishment, the Court held that the
prison's practices which had given rise to the conditions were reasona-
ble responses founded on legitimate security concerns. T0
In 1987 the Supreme Court announced the foremost decision in
the area of prisoners' rights. In Turner v. Safley 02 the Court defini-
tively established the standard for reviewing prison regulations that im-
pinge on a prisoner's fundamental constitutional right.10 3 In Turner in-
mates at Renz Correctional Institution of the Missouri Department of
Corrections (Renz) brought a class action seeking injunctive relief and
93. 573 F.2d at 124.
94. Since the detainees had not been tried and convicted, they necessarily possessed a pre-
sumption of innocence regarding the crimes for which they had been charged. 441 U.S. at 532.
"Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court . . . relied on the 'presumption of innocence'
as the source of the detainee's substantive right to be free from conditions of confinement that are
not justified by compelling necessity." Id.
95. Id. at 533.
96. These include the allocation of the burden of proof and a charge to the jury to rely
only upon the evidence produced at trial. Id. at 533.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 534.
99. Id. at 535.
100. Id. at 537-61
101. Id. at 561.
102. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
103. See Gerhardstein, False Teeth? Thornburgh's Claim that Turner's Standard for De-




damages arising from two prison regulations. 0 " The Renz facility
houses both male and female offenders,0 5 and the first of the chal-
lenged regulations was a rule limiting correspondence between in-
mates.'06 The second regulation placed restrictions on inmates' ability
to marry.'0 "
The Supreme Court accepted the case with the task of redefining
the proper standard of review for prisoners' rights claims.'08 Following
the trend of the earlier prisoners' rights cases, the Court explained the
importance of giving great deference to prison officials. 0 9 The Court
then announced the current standard for reviewing prison regulations
allegedly violating inmates' rights: "[W]hen a prison regulation im-
pinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.""'
The Court applied several factors from the earlier cases which it
deemed relevant in determining whether prison regulations were rea-
sonable."' First, a "valid, rational connection" must exist between the
regulation and the legitimate interest put forward to justify it."' Thus,
if the connection is arbitrary or irrational, the regulation will be
deemed invalid." 3 The second factor to be considered is whether alter-
104. 482 U.S. at 81.
105. id.
106. Id. at 81-82. Specifically, the regulation permitted correspondence dealing with legal
matters or between "immediate family members" who were incarcerated. Id. at 81. Other corre-
spondence between inmates had to be approved by certain prison officials. Id. at 81-82. "At Renz,
the District Court found that the rule 'as practiced is that inmates may not write non-family
inmates'." Id. (quoting Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 591 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
107. Id. at 82. This regulation was introduced after the original litigation between the par-
ties. Id. Under the marriage regulation, prisoners could marry only if granted permission by the
prison superintendent. Id. The regulation further advised that such permission would not be given
unless there was a compelling reason for the marriage. Id. "Compelling" was indicated to mean
that only "a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would be considered a compelling
reason." Id.
In addition to those incarcerated at Renz, those included in the class for litigation were per-
sons who wished to marry inmates in the Missouri prison system and whose rights to marry "have
been or will be violated." Id. It also included those persons who wished to correspond with in-
mates. Id. The district court declared both regulations to be unconstitutional. 586 F. Supp. at 594-
96. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court properly applied a strict
scrutiny standard of review. Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985). Both courts cited
Martinez as authority for reviewing the regulations with strict scrutiny. Id. at 1313.
108. 482 U.S. at 85.
109. Id. at 89.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
113. Id. at 89-90.
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native avenues exist whereby the prisoner can still exercise the right at
issue. 1 14 Third, the court should consider the extent the accommodation
of the right would affect other inmates and prison resources." 5 The
fourth and final consideration is that "the absence of ready alternatives
is evidence of the reasonableness of [the] regulation.""' 6 The Court
cautioned that the last factor should not be construed as a least restric-
tive alternative test.1 7 Instead, it explained that if an inmate pointed to
a feasible alternative which could accommodate his right at a "de
minimis cost to valid penoligical interests," it would be evidence of the
regulation's invalidity." 8
Applying the four factors of the reasonable basis test to the chal-
lenged regulations, the Court held the inmate correspondence restric-
tion constitutional." ' However, the Court struck down the marriage
regulation, holding marriage to be a constitutional right that survives
incarceration.' Although the Court noted that prison officials are free
to place reasonable restrictions on a prison's right to marry,' 2 ' ready
alternatives existed that would have been de minimis to prison con-
cerns. Thus, the Court held the challenged regulation to be "an exag-
gerated response." '122
Since the marriage regulation did not pass muster under the rea-
sonable basis test, the Court did not decide whether the heightened
114. Id. at 90.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 91.
119. Id. at 91-93.
120. Id. at 96. Noting that marriage is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court held that certain incidents
of marriage are unaffected by confinement and are "sufficient to form a constitutionally protected
marital relationship in the prison context." Id.
121. Id. at 95-97.
122. Id. at 97-98. The Bureau was concerned that inmate marriages might lead to love
triangles that would cause security problems and violence among jealous inmates. Id. at 97. The
Court determined that the marriage regulation constituted an exaggerated response to those secur-
ity concerns. Id. at 97-98. The Court cited a regulation governing inmate marriages at federal
prisons as an example of a ready alternative. Id. at 98. Instead of a blanket prohibition of inmate
marriages, 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986), permits inmate marriages unless the warden determines
that the marriage would threaten the security or order of the institution. 482 U.S. at 98. The
Court also distinguished an earlier decision which summarily affirmed a prohibition on prisoners'
right to marry because that particular restriction applied only to inmates with life sentences. Id. at
96. (citing Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974), summarily affg Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F.
Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (the prohibition of marriage was held to constitute part of the punish-
ment of the crime)).
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Martinez standard should be applied to determine the rights of unin-
carcerated persons who wished to marry prisoners.12 3 It suggested,
however, that the stricter test might be employed when a prison regula-
tion impinges upon rights of nonprisoners.24
Eight days after Turner was decided, the Court handed down an-
other decision in which it applied the reasonable basis test to a prison
regulation. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz'2" the Court reversed the
Third Circuit by upholding a prison regulation impairing Islamic in-
mates' ability to attend certain religious services.1"6 The prisoners
claimed that this restriction violated their first amendment right to the
free exercise of religion."2 7 They also contended that the prison policy
should be reviewed with heightened scrutiny because it prohibited, in-
stead of merely limited, a constitutional right.
28
The Court responded that the Turner standard of review was ap-
propriate despite the regulation's prohibition of a constitutional
right. 29 After applying the reasonable basis test and the factors set out
in Turner, the Court upheld the policy.' Furthermore, the majority
criticized the court of appeals for placing a burden on prison officials to
prove that there was no alternative methods for accommodating the
prisoners' asserted rights.' 3' The Court explained, "[B]y placing the
burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of alternatives, the
approach . . . fails to reflect the respect and deference that the United
States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administra-
tors.' 32 The rulings in Turner and O'Lone conclusively established the
reasonable basis test as the proper standard of review for prison regula-
tions that purportedly infringe on prisoners' constitutional rights.
123. Id. at 97. See supra note 107.
124. Id. Indeed, dicta in the opinion indicated that such a standard might well be appropri-
ate in such a case. Id. Although it was not raised by the inmates, the Court explained, "IThis
implication of the interests of nonprisoners may support application of the Martinez standard,
because the regulation may entail a 'consequential restriction on the [constitutional] rights of
those who are not prisoners.' " Id.
125. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
126. Id. at 345. Specifically, prison rules requiring outside work details for several prisoners
precluded Islamic inmates the opportunity to attend Jumu'ah, a Muslim religious service that is
traditionally held on Fridays. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 349 n.2.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 353.
131. id. at 350 (citing Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482
U.S. 342 (1987)).
132. Id. at 350.
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In two of its most recent prisoners' rights cases, the Supreme
Court has applied the Turner reasonable basis test. In Thornburgh v.
Abbott1"3 the Court upheld a Federal Bureau of Prisons regulation per-
mitting wardens to restrict an inmate's right to receive certain publica-
tions.13 The Court's analysis began with a determination that the rea-
sonable basis test was the proper standard of review for the challenged
regulation. 13 5 Upon reaching that decision, the Court laid to rest any
notions that the Martinez standard, which was less deferential to prison
authorities, was the proper standard of review for regulations that re-
strict incoming correspondence from nonprisoners. 136 Instead of the
Martinez standard, the Court applied the reasonableness test which it
determined was not "toothless. 1 37 Having established the appropriate
standard of review, the Court applied the Turner factors and found the
regulation to be "facially valid."13 8 It then remanded the case for an
examination of the specific publications issue. 3 9
One year later in Washington v. Harper40 the Court reversed a
Washington Supreme Court decision involving the administration of
antipsychotic drugs to an inmate without his consent. Because of the
"highly intrusive nature" of the drug treatment, the Washington court
determined that the inmate's liberty interest in refusing treatment was
such that he should be afforded great procedural protections. 4 '
133. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
134. Id. at 419. The regulations at issue, 28 C.F.R. § § 540.70 and 540.71 (1988), allow the
warden to reject publications that are determined to be "detrimental to the security, good order,
discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity." 490 U.S. at 404. "The
regulations provide[d] procedural safeguards for both the recipient and the sender." Id.
135. Id. at 414.
136. Id. at 413. The Court noted:
The implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security are of a categorically
lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials. Any attempt to justify a
similar categorical distinction between incoming correspondence from prisoners (to
which we applied a reasonableness standard in Turner) and incoming correspondence
from nonprisoners would likely prove futile, and we do not invite it. To the extent that
Martinez itself suggests such a distinction, we today overrule that case; the Court ac-
complished much of this step when it decided Turner.
Id. at 413-14.
137. Id. at 414 (citation omitted). See also Gerhardstein, supra note 103.
138. 490 U.S. at 419.
139. Id.
140. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
141. Id. at 1034 (quoting Harper v. Washington, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 880-81, 759 P.2d 358,
363 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990)). Analyzing the case on due process grounds, the
Washington court held that prison officials could not force the inmate to undergo treatment with-
out affording him "the full panoply of adversarial procedural protections... " Id. at 1035 (quot-
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The Supreme Court held that the state court erred in not applying
the reasonable basis standard of review.14 Relying on Turner, the
Court explained that the reasonableness test is proper for reviewing
prison regulations that infringe on the constitutional rights of prison-
ers. 143 The Court also noted that the lesser standard of review an-
nounced in Turner is applicable even when the regulation infringes
upon a fundamental right that would otherwise warrant a more height-
ened level of scrutiny.' Applying the factors set out in Turner, the
Court held that administration of antipsychotic drugs to an inmate
without his consent is constitutional.'
4 5
Following Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit in Mon-
mouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro141 applied
the Turner test to a prison regulation requiring county inmates to ob-
tain court-ordered releases and independent financing 47 before they
could receive an abortion. 1 8 In Lanzaro the court first examined the
right to an abortion and concluded that a woman's right to elect an
abortion is "fundamental.""11 9 It then determined that the challenged
regulation did not pass muster under the reasonable basis test. 50 The
court reasoned that an inmate's election to terminate her pregnancy
would not entail any additional drain on prison resources since special
accommodations would have to be made anyway for her to carry the
ing Harper v. Washington, 110 Wash.2d 873, 883-84, 759 P.2d 358, 364-65 (1988), rev'd, 110 S.
Ct. 1028 (1990)). Moreover, the Court held that the State had a burden to prove by "clear,
cogent, and convincing" evidence that the administration of the medication was a necessary and
effective means for satisfying a compelling state interest. Id.
142. Id. at 1037.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
145. Id. at 1044.
146. 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
147. Essentially, county funds would finance inmate abortions only in life threatening situa-
tions. 834 F.2d at 328.
148. 834 F.2d at 327-28. For an excellent discussion of this case and the legal status of
inmate abortions, see Norz, Prenatal and Postnatal Rights of Incarcerated Mothers, 20, COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. S-55 (1989). See also Comment, Women and Children First: An Examination
of the Unique Needs of Women in Prison, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 455 (1986); and Note,
Inmate Abortions - The Right to Government Funding Behind the Prison Gates, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 550 (1980). Federal regulations providing guidelines for inmate abortions can be found at 28
C.F.R. § 551.23 (1990).
149. 834 F.2d at 334. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
150. 834 F.2d at 351. The court concluded that "the court-ordered release requirement (1)
bears no logical connection to any legitimate penological interest; (2) deprives inmates electing to
terminate their pregnancies an alternative means of exercising their right; and (3) constitutes an




The court then held that the court-ordered release requirement
bore no "logical connection to any legitimate penoligical inter-
est. . . ."5 Also, the court determined that the county had to assume
the expenses for an inmate choosing an elective, nontherapeutic
abortion.
15 3
In the wake of this extensive line of prisoners' rights cases, the
Eighth Circuit decided Goodwin v. Turner and upheld a prison regula-
tion prohibiting a prisoner from artificially inseminating his wife. 54
The court first acknowledged the right of procreation and assumed,
without deciding, that it survived incarceration. 55 The court then ad-
dressed Goodwin's argument that denial of the right to artificially in-
seminate his wife had a "direct impact" on her right to procreate, and
that a strict level of scrutiny was therefore appropriate. " The court
based its rejection of this argument on a comparison of the right to
procreate and the freedom of association.15 7 The court noted that a
necessary consequence of incarceration is the denial of an inmate's
freedom to be with family and friends. " Therefore, regulations limit-
ing visitation are not subject to strict scrutiny even if they infringe on
the associational rights of a prisoner's spouse. 159 Such regulations, the
court reasoned, are upheld whenever they are reasonably related to le-
gitimate prison objectives.' 60 Therefore, by analogy, strict scrutiny is
not necessary when other prison regulations have an incidental adverse
effect on the fundamental rights of a prisoner's spouse. 161 The court
added that in the prison context even fundamental rights are subject to
151. Id. at 341-42
152. Id. at 351.
153. Id.
154. 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (Judge Magill wrote the opinion for the three-judge
tribunal).
155. Id. at 1398. Since the lesser scrutiny of the reasonable basis test could be applied to
uphold the Bureau's refusal of Goodwin's request, the court saw no need to determine whether
procreation was a fundamental right surviving incarceration. Id. The court noted, "Even assum-
ing, without deciding, that the exercise of Goodwin's right to procreate is not fundamentally in-
consistent with his status as a prisoner, the restriction imposed by the Bureau is reasonably related
to achieving its legitimate penological interest." Id.
156. Id. at 1399.
157. Id.







In determining whether the prison regulation was constitutional,
the court relied upon the four factors set forth in the Turner test.16
First, the court held that there was a valid connection between the reg-
ulation and the Bureau's stated interest.'" The overriding legitimate
penoligical interest in the court's estimation was the Bureau's interest
in treating male and female prisoners equally.'' The court accepted
the Bureau's assertion that, if ordered to allow males to procreate, it
would have to make available a similar program for female inmates.1 66
Such a consequence, predicted the court, "would have a significant im-
pact on the allocation of prison resources generally ....
Goodwin conceded that procreation would be a complicated bur-
den with respect to female inmates.1 68 However, he countered that the
issue of whether a female's right to conceive survives incarceration
should be decided in an actual case involving such facts.169 This argu-
ment did not persuade the majority. Because the Bureau had an ex-
press policy of treating both sexes the same, forcing it to allow males to
procreate, would also force it to allow females the same privilege or
compromise an established prison policy.17 0
Applying the second Turner factor, the court found that no rea-
sonable alternatives existed whereby Goodwin's request could be
granted.17 The court determined that this was evidence of the reasona-
bleness of the challenged policy. 72 Since no ready alternative was
found, the court did not apply the final factor from Turner dealing with
less restrictive alternatives. 17 3
Then the court applied the third factor involving the impact the
162. Id. at 1398-99.
163. Id. at 1399-1400.
164. Id. at 1399.
165. Id. The court explained that the Bureau's other concerns (i.e., potential tort liability)
were not "legitimate penological interests .... " Id. at 1399 n.7 (emphasis in original).




170. Id. Although the court did not make reference to a specific regulation in this regard, it
simply noted that the objective of equal treatment of male and female prisoners was "established
prison policy.'" Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the potential for expanded medical programs for






accommodation of the right would have on prison resources. 74 Again,
the court resorted to the argument that the right of procreation would
significantly impact prison resources if it were expanded to apply to
female inmates. 17 Allowing a male prisoner to procreate would lead to
the kind of "ripple effect" referred to in Turner.'76 Therefore, discre-
tion of prison officials was a primary concern. 1 77 Because the prison
policy satisfied the Turner factors, the court determined that the prison
regulation prohibiting artificial insemination satisfied the reasonable-
ness test.
178
In his dissent, Judge McMillian argued in favor of reversing the
lower court's decision. 7 9 Before applying the reasonableness test, the
dissent addressed the right of procreation to determine whether it was
one which should survive incarceration.' 80 Relying on Skinner and
Lanzaro, the dissenting judge determined that Goodwin had indeed as-
serted a fundamental right which should survive incarceration.
First, Judge McMillian disagreed with the majority's acceptance
of the equal treatment objective asserted by the Bureau.' 8' The Bu-
reau's interest in equal treatment of prisoners "is, at best, only tangen-
tially present here," stated Judge McMillian. 82 The fact that the right
could be legitimately denied to female prisoners, he reasoned, did not
bear a rational relationship to the Bureau's asserted interest of equal
treatment. 8 3 Judge McMillian criticized the majority for considering a
hypothetical case in support of its holding that the granting of Good-
win's request would have a "significant impact" on prison resources.18"
He countered that such hypothetical situations should not be given
"significant weight."' 88 Furthermore, the dissent contended that a court
could apply the Turner test to a female prisoner and justify a. different
result.' 86 In summation, Judge McMillian wrote that the court should
have held the Bureau's "exaggerated response" to Goodwin's "narrowly
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1401 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1404-05.
182. Id. at 1405.
183. Id.





tailored request" for the exercise of his constitutional right
unconstitutional.
187
In recognition of this trend in prisoners' rights cases, the Eighth
Circuit, which had applied an improper standard in Turner v. Safley, 88
did not want to make the same mistake again. Thus, when confronted
with Goodwin's request to artificially inseminate his wife, the Eighth
Circuit reviewed the Bureau's denial of that right under the reasonable
basis test.18' Consequently, the majority mechanically applied the four-
part test from the Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Safley and
accorded deference to the judgment of prison administrators.
The majority also declined to resolve the issue of whether procrea-
tion is a fundamental right surviving incarceration. 90 The dissent took
the opposite view."' Determining that procreation is a fundamental
right surviving incarceration, Judge McMillian concluded that the rea-
sonable basis test, as applied to Goodwin's specific request, afforded an
accommodation of that right.192 Criticizing the majority for resorting to
hypothetical situations, Judge McMillian's analysis focused on Good-
win's specific request. As a result, his dissent was well-reasoned and
provided a more comprehensive examination of the actual case before
the court.
Based on the tenor of recent Supreme Court decisions in this area,
the result reached by the Eighth Circuit would likely be affirmed if the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The dissent's arguments, although
well-reasoned and logical, would probably not pass muster under the
Supreme Court's application of the reasonable basis test which strongly
favors the discretion of prison officials.
The ultimate result in this case of first impression clearly reveals
187. Id. Judge McMillian argued that such an event would not be a proper justification for
the denial of Goodwin's request in this case. Id.
188. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
189. 908 F.2d at 1407. Judge McMillian also pointed out that Goodwin's request could be
granted at a "negligible" cost to prison resources. Id. at 1406. This was because Goodwin sought
only a clean container and had repeatedly offered to pay any related expenses. Id. at 1407.
190. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 155. For an excellent argument supporting the notion that procreation
survives incarceration, see Note, supra note 1.
192. 908 F.2d at 1402. Although conceding that procreative rights can be substantially re-
stricted during incarceration, Judge McMillian nonetheless noted, "I think there is little question
that the procreative right survives incarceration." Id. Noting that Skinner placed marriage and
procreation on an equal plane, Judge McMillian read the Supreme Court's decision in Turner v.
Safley, which held that marriage rights survive incarceration, as supporting the contention that
procreation should be afforded similar protection. Id.
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the obstacles cluttering the path of the incarcerated who wish to assert
violations of constitutionally protected rights. The Goodwin decision
demonstrates that prison regulations have become increasingly difficult
to effectively challenge. This is true even in cases such as this where a
prisoner's otherwise fundamental constitutional right has been impli-
cated.
Todd M. Turner
